Active Labour Market Instruments Targeting Young People and the Youth Guarantee Programme by Krekó, Judit et al.
5.2 Active lAbour mArket instruments tArgeting...
105
5.2 ACTIVE LABOUR MARKET INSTRUMENTS TARGETING 
YOUNG PEOPLE AND THE YOUTH GUARANTEE 
PROGRAMME
Judit Krekó, Tamás Molnár & Ágota Scharle
Recognising the long-term risks of youth unemployment, European Union 
countries established the Youth Guarantee (YG) scheme in 2014. Under the 
YG scheme, Member States have committed themselves to providing young 
people under the age of 25 with a specific, good quality offer from the or-
ganisation implementing the scheme (this is usually the public employment 
service) shortly after completing their studies or losing their job, starting in 
2015.1 The meaningful opportunity offered could be, for instance, a job sup-
ported by wage subsidies, training, participation in programmes promoting 
traineeship or entrepreneurship (Tóth–Temesszentandrási, 2019).
Most of the above mentioned labour market measures were on offer by the 
Hungarian labour offices before the YG scheme. The novelty of the YG pri-
marily lies in the fact that the state guarantees that it will provide early, mean-
ingful and personalised assistance to all young people not in employment, ed-
ucation or training (NEET), for the implementation of which EU funds will 
provide significant financial instruments. Most of the programme elements of 
the YG system are operated by employment services for registered jobseekers. 
In this subchapter, we evaluate these programme elements, we do not analyse 
traineeship and entrepreneurship programmes offered by other organisations.2
The results of the YG scheme can be evaluated on three levels. The first ques-
tion is whether the employment services succeed in reaching and bringing the 
NEET youth into contact with employment services. The next question is in 
what proportion and within what timeframe young people already registered 
as jobseekers at the employment services3 are given an offer, and whether their 
inclusion in the most appropriate active labour market programme will be 
successful. The final question of the effectiveness of the YG scheme is the ex-
tent to which the programme’s tools improve the longer-term labour market 
prospects of young people.
For the time being, we do not have sufficient data available to examine the 
employment effects of the YG programme elements, therefore we do not deal 
with the impact assessment of the individual measures here either.4
In terms of the first level, reaching the NEET youth, the programme did 
not show significant results. The Council recommendations preparing the 
introduction of the YG prioritise addressing vulnerable, inactive young peo-
ple facing multiple barriers by developing effective information strategies and 
strengthening cooperation with relevant partners (EU, 2013).
1 At the start of the programme 
in 2015, the commitment 
in Hungary was for an offer 
within six months after regis-
tration, currently an offer must 
be made to young jobseekers 
within four months.
2 The employment service oper-
ates the GINOP 5.2.1. and the 
VEKOP 8.2.1. programmes. 
The internship programme 
(GINOP 5.2.4.) is implemented 
by vocational training centres, 
and the programmes support-
ing entrepreneurship (GINOP 
5.2.3., 5.1.9., 5.2.7.) are imple-
mented by consortia of profes-
sional organisations.
3 The employment service has 
been part of government offices 
since 2015, and its branches 
operate as the employment de-
partment of the district offices.
4 The Youth Guarantee Pro-
gramme is being evaluated 
at an early stage in a study by 
Hétfa Research Institute (Ágnes 
Szabó-Morvai et al, 2015).
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Prior to the introduction of the Youth Guarantee Programme, the employ-
ment service reached nearly 60 percent of those NEET youth who would like 
to work, but certain barriers (such as weak motivation or lack of qualification) 
make it difficult for them to get a job, so they would be particularly in need 
of the assistance the programme could provide.5 The rate of registrants in this 
group increased from 48 percent observed before the introduction of the pro-
gramme to 58 percent in the first year, however in the following two years, it 
fell below the previous levels (see Figure 5.1.5 in the previous subchapter). In 
the group of young people who are not hindered in their job hunt, the rate of 
registrants is 10–15 percent higher and has decreased less since the introduc-
tion of the programme. This indicates that the programme did not, or it only 
temporarily strengthened the partnerships or the inclusion tools which made 
it possible to reach inactive young people. A similar conclusion was reached by 
Szabó-Morvai et al (2015) based on data from the first months following the in-
troduction of the programme, and this is supported by the interviews conduct-
ed in the labour organisation in the spring of 2019 (Budapest Institute, 2019).
On the second level, we analyse the timing and the types of programmes 
that the registered unemployed youth entered and evaluate the targeting and 
the relevance of the programmes. Based on the data of young people under 
the age of 25 entering active labour market programmes, the distribution of 
labour market programmes has significantly changed in recent years.
Based on individual level data of registered jobseekers, we examined where 
young people entering the labour register between January 2015 and June 
2017 end up in the first six months after entry (Figure 5.2.1). According to 
this, since 2015, the chances of a young person entering the register to get 
into an active measure within half a year increased, and at the same time the 
probability of a young person entering public works or not to participate in 
any programme while remaining in the register decreased. More than half of 
all entrants are removed from the register within six months without entering 
either public works or an active programme. They either found work without 
help or became inactive.
The distribution of the active programmes by type is shown on Figure 5.2.2. 
Based on this, in addition to the dynamic increase of wage subsidies6 of al-
most 70 percent, the number of entrants to training programmes stagnated 
between 2015 and 2018, so the weight of training within active programmes 
decreased overall.
The fact that the labour market environment in Hungary has changed sig-
nificantly in recent years also plays an important role in the transformation 
of the distribution of labour market instruments: besides the dynamic expan-
sion of employment, unemployment, including youth unemployment, has 
also decreased. In any case, the reduction of the public works programme 
and the increase in the rate of wage subsidies are positive developments, as 
5 Based on LFS data, see 
subchapter 5.1 for more details. 
We classified in separate groups 
those who could not work due 
to illness or family ties: the rate 
of registrants in this group is 
barely 5 percent.
6 Wage subsidies do not include 
subsidies provided by the Job 
Protection Act, the latter is dis-
cussed in subchapter 5.4.
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the recipients of wage subsidies work in the open labour market at a higher 
wage level than in public works. International analyses show that wage subsidy 
schemes providing employment in the private sector could improve post-pro-
gramme employment opportunities to a greater extent than public employ-
ment schemes7 (Card et al, 2018). The results of early analyses of the Hun-
garian public works scheme also demonstrate that public employment does 
not aid long-term employment (Cseres-Gergely–Molnár, 2015, Köllő–Scharle, 
2012). At the same time, based on the significant increase in employment and 
the increase in labour shortages, it is likely that the wage subsidy instruments 
supported, in part, the employment of young people who could have found 
employment without support.
Figure 5.2.1: What happens to young people under the age of 25 registered  
as jobseekers in the first six months after registration?
* Until 30 June 2017. The horizontal axis shows the year of registration.
Source: Own calculation based on the Admin3 database of Institute of 
Economics Data bank. We would like to thank István Boza for his help 
in processing the database.
Figure 5.2.2: The number of entrants into the Youth Guarantee Programme  
by active instruments
* Housing subsidy, entrepreneurship subsidy.
Source: Ministry of Finance.
7 In fact, the employment im-
pacts of the latter are typically 
negligible or negative.
Judit KreKó, tamás molnár & ágota scharle
108
Regarding the targeting of the programmes, we examine the extent to which 
vulnerable and low-educated groups in the labour market benefited from the 
expansion of active labour market programmes. In order to answer this ques-
tion, we used a linear probability model to examine what factors influence 
whether the young people who registered as jobseekers between 30 June 2015 
and 30 June 2017 are enrolled in the Youth Guarantee Programme within half 
a year. The results are shown in Table 5.2.1.
Table 5.2.1: Regression estimate of the factors determining the entry of registered 
jobseekers under the age of 25 into the Youth Guarantee Programme
Year of entry to unemployment registry
2015–2017a 2015 2016 2017a
Male
–0.003 –0.010*** 0.004 0.000
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007)
Max. primary education
–0.102*** –0.092*** –0.109*** –0.122***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008)
Below the age of 20
–0.003 0.004 –0.007 –0.018**
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.009)
Number of unemployment 
spells
–0.018*** –0.012*** –0.013*** –0.038***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.009)
With no work experience
0.095*** 0.092*** 0.086*** 0.126***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.009)
Constant
0.252*** 0.248*** 0.211*** 0.348***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.011) (0.020)
Number of observations 104,582 51,866 38,126 14,590
R2 0.039 0.049 0.032 0.052
Average probability of entry 0.21 0.20 0.21 0.28
a Until 30 June 2017.
Standard errors in parenthesis.
Dependent variable: binary variable with a value of 1 if the registered jobseeker be-
low the age of 25 enters an active measure of the programme within half a year after 
registration.
Significant on ***1 percent, **5 percent, *10 percent level.
Source: Own calculation based on the Admin3 dataset of KTI KRTK.
The regression results show that those with no more than primary education 
and those re-entering the register are less likely to be included in an instrument 
of the Youth Guarantee Programme, and this disproportion did not decrease 
between 2015 and 2017. As a consequence, the labour market instruments are 
less likely to reach those young people who inherently have worse employment 
opportunities. This is probably mainly due to the fact that the low-skilled are 
more difficult to place in the labour market, even with wage subsidies.
In light of the results, the currently low and stagnant rate of training can be 
considered unfavourable, and more intensive involvement of young people 
with low educational attainment in training could presumably improve the 
situation. However, under the Young Guarantee Programme, young jobseek-
ers can participate primarily in vocational training courses that directly pro-
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mote employment, and training focusing on the development of basic com-
petences is not included in the elements of the Programme in a significant 
portion of the districts. In the case of unskilled young people, in addition to 
the lack of vocational training, in many cases the lack of basic skills hinders 
employment. Furthermore, based on international experience (e.g. Kluve et 
al, 2019), the involvement of low-skilled, disadvantaged young people can be 
improved by more intensive use of personal counsellors and mentors, who can 
help young people choose an appropriate programme after registration based 
on personal abilities and needs.8
Therefore, overall the data show that active instruments, including wage 
subsidies, reach an increasingly high proportion of young people registered 
as jobseekers within an increasingly short period, in which, however, in ad-
dition to the Youth Guarantee Programme, the growth of demand for labour 
and the decrease in unemployment played a role as well. NEET youth fur-
ther away from the labour market are less likely to be included in the register, 
while low-skilled people are less likely to be included in the scheme’s active 
instruments than their better-off peers. Thus, in order to improve the Youth 
Guarantee Programme, greater efforts should be made to reach young peo-
ple in need, and training programmes that improve general competencies and 
mentors should be used in greater proportion.
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